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Natural Rights and History:
Hugo Grotius's Modern
Translation of Aristotle
Jeremy Seth Geddert

Cicero writes in de Finibus that "nature never forgets its own primary prop
erties." This leads him to inquire, "then how comes it that human nature
alone abandons man?"1 If Hugo Grotius were alive today, he might wonder
the same thing. Grotius's language of nature remains surprisingly enduring in
contemporary discourse. Yet most students of political thought seem to have
forgotten the man. This inattention is a notable change from the seventeenth
through nineteenth centuries, during which one contemporary described Gro
tius as "the greatest universal scholar since Aristotle."2 Grotius's fame began
in 1598, when King Henry IV of France pronounced the fifteen-year-old
prodigy as "the miracle of Holland." By his early twenties he became the
Pensionary of Rotterdam, and by his early thirties he penned major works of
history, literature, political philosophy, and theology. After imprisonment for
his ideas, and daring escape from prison in a chest of books, he spent the rest
of his life in exile—first under a pension from King Henry's successor, then
as Swedish ambassador to France. During this exile, he wrote his master
piece, de Jure Belli ac Pads (DJB), or The [Natural] Right of War and
Peace—the first major.work of international law. This work would remain
almost continuously in print for the next two centuries. After Grotius's death,
Samuel von Pufendorf would come to hold the chair in the "law of nature and
nations"—a subject that Grotius was thought to have created. Rousseau
would regularly use Grotius as a foil, describing him as a "dishonest child";
Kant would more politely criticize him as a "tiresome comforter." More
positively, the American founders would read and recommend Grotius, citing
him multiple times in the Federalist Papers J
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After a century and a half of neglect, scholars are increasingly seeking to
restore Grotius's great legacy today. However, the content of that rediscov
ered reputation is remarkably contested. Is he a modern figure or a premodern one? Jean Barbeyrac, the translator of an influential 1724 edition of
DJB, would portray Grotius as a great innovator: the first to "break the ice"
after "the long dark medieval winter."4 Giambattista Vico would even con
sider Grotius to be one of the four "authors of history," following in the
lineage of such modern trailblazers as Machiavelli and Bacon by introducing
the methods of hypothesis and empirical verification into the historical-social
sciences.5 Yet a recent translator, Oliver O'Donovan, sees Grotius instead as
the last representative of a premodern conception of nature: "the last great
figure in whose thought a unity of theology, law, philology, and history is
effective."6
Grotius's chronology does little to settle the question, as he stands at the
crossroads of the medieval and the modern. He was a contemporary of both
Descartes and Hobbes, and lived in the Paris whose Mersenne circle included
both of those figures. Grotius's final decade saw the groundbreaking—and
fundamentally modern—publications of Descartes's Discourse on Method
and Hobbes's de Cive. Yet Grotius himself would be unable to recall a brief
meeting with Descartes early in Descartes's career, and his private letters
express his disagreement with Hobbes's basic presuppositions in de Cive.
Nor does Grotius's approach to international relations offer much help in
clarifying the ambiguity. His world was that of the Thirty Years' War, in
which the pluralism of Europe was becoming an accepted fact of life. Gro
tius's DJB anticipates the state sovereignty that would be enshrined in the
1648 Treaty of Westphalia that concluded the war, and offers much guidance
on a secular basis acceptable outside Christendom. Yet Grotius would none
theless advocate for such decidedly premodern concepts as punitive war,
humanitarian intervention, and restraints based on religion.
Perhaps the most promising way to settle the question is to explore Gro
tius's conception of nature. Some observers portray Grotius as the first mod
ern natural law thinker, or even the first to develop a modern natural rights
theory. One representative (and influential) figure is Richard Tuck, who
attempts to show the similarities between Grotius and Hobbes. In doing so,
he positions Grotius as a progenitor of modern thought and as accomplishing
a fundamental break with the ancient approach to nature. Indeed, Tuck lo
cates his treatment of Grotius in the Cambridge History of Medieval Thought
under the heading "The End of Aristotelianism."7
Tuck's argument for Grotius's essentially modern concept of nature has
at least four elements. First, he sees in Grotius a preoccupation with skepti
cism and an unwillingness to take for granted a natural moral order, which
distinguishes Grotius from medieval writers.8 In the third paragraph of DJB,
Grotius admits that some see "good" as a name rather than a reality. He
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proceeds to outline Carneades's argument on behalf of this premise, and then
argues against it.9 In doing so, Tuck argues that Grotius has already moved
the ground of the argument from that of natural law to that of skepticism.
Rather than taking a natural right foundation for granted, he attempts to
convince the skeptics on their own terms.10 He is not content to defend
natural right on the authority of history and tradition, but rather undertakes to
prove it as if from the ground up. In this way, Tuck argues that he prefigures
Descartes and Hobbes's distinctly modern method of reasoning that begins
from the individual rather than from authority.
Second, Tuck sees a further rejection of authority in Grotius's approach to
Aristotle, the great philosopher of nature and touchstone of premodern politi
cal thought. Inasmuch as medieval thinkers ever set out to combat skepti
cism, they would do so by using the arguments of Aristotle. In contrast,
Grotius remarks in his Prolegomena to DJB that Aristotle's preeminence has
been turned into a tyranny, such that truth is nowhere "more repressed than
by Aristotle's name." Rather than using Aristotle as an antidote to skepti
cism, Grotius apparently targets Aristotle for criticism in the same fashion as
Carneades (if perhaps for different reasons).11 In this reading, Grotius softens
the ground for Hobbes's all-out attack on Aristotle.12
In keeping with this approach of conceding ground to skeptics, Tuck
thirdly argues that Grotius's defense of natural law is rather skeletal. Grotius
reduces the thick conception of traditional medieval natural law to a mini
malism more defensible to skeptics. In particular, Tuck sees in him a defense
of natural law only on the basis of self-interest. He cites a passage from
Grotius's early de Jure Praedae stating that "[T]he first principle of the
natural order ... is the love whose primary force and action are toward
oneself." Altruism is reducible to self-interest.13 This would prefigure
Hobbes's contractarian political theory, one grounded on enlightened selfinterest rather than natural human sociability.
Fourthly, Tuck understands Grotius to base this limited natural law on a
modern basis of a priori rationalism. De Jure Praedae begins with a series of
nine fundamental rules and thirteen associated laws. Tuck infers a Grotian
intention to introduce a mathematical model into the human sciences—a
distinctly modern methodology.14 He compares it to Leviathan, which begins
with the basic right of nature and proceeds to deduce nineteen subsequent
laws of nature.15
Tuck does not put forward the fifth—and best-known—argument for
Grotius's break with medieval world, but his reasoning is consistent with it.
This is Grotius's (in)famous "impious hypothesis." After outlining his basic
elements of justice, Grotius adds the following note: "what we have been
saying would have a degree of validity even if we should concede that which
cannot be conceded without the utmost wickedness, that there is no God, or
that the affairs of men are of no concern to Him."16 In granting to atheists the
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ability to know natural law, some see Grotius as consigning to irrelevance the
knowledge of God for the study of the human world. He appears to reduce
political philosophy to deist or atheist premises—supposedly a clear break
with the classical tradition.
These arguments all suggest that the ambiguity around Grotius's histori
cal legacy can be solved by reference to his treatment of nature. Tuck thus
uncovers a herald of modernity whose concept of nature is not a rich teleological conception of human flourishing but a thin rationalistic baseline of
behavior. I would like to agree with the first premise about the importance of
nature in Grotius; an examination of the concept helps to clarify the ambigu
ity around his legacy. However, I would like to take issue with the second. A
closer look at Grotius's concept of nature actually reveals a thinker seeking
to preserve a rich classical heritage in a modern world. The language may be
new, but the concepts are not. Grotius is best understood not as a protoHobbesian enemy of Aristotle, but a translator of Aristotle in the idiom of
modernity.
QUESTIONING THE "GROTIUS AS MODERN" NARRATIVE
Tuck is an erudite scholar, and all of the elements in this portrait of Grotius
have a superficial plausibility. Before suggesting an alternative reading, it is
necessary to engage with this portrait on its own terms. One basic and funda
mental concern arises from Tuck's methodology, which prioritizes de Jure
Praedae. Tuck portrays this work as paradigmatic and downplays de Jure
Belli with the assertion that "the basic arguments ... are presented un
changed, and indeed greatly clarified."17 Yet there are significant differences
between the two. In de Jure Praedae, Grotius follows a voluntarist approach,
which can perhaps be seen to prefigure Hobbes, and even the later postmetaphysical modern thought of Hume and Kant. Yet in de Jure Belli, Gro
tius clearly states that his natural laws are inherent in the nature of the
universe, rather than deriving from the will of God. (If nothing else, his
"impious hypothesis" makes this crystal clear.) If the truth of Grotius's argu
ment is not dependent on God's action in the world (or even his mere exis
tence), it seems clear that Grotius has fully repudiated the voluntarism of his
earlier work. Defenders of scholasticism frequently point to the voluntarism
of Scotus and Ockham as bringing about the end of naturalism. If this is
indeed the relevant cleavage, Grotius appears to stand firmly with the Aristo
telians.
Indeed, if there is a fundamental shift from the 1604 de Jure Praedae to
the 1625 de Jure Belli, it seems reasonable to suggest that de Jure Praedae
was the anomaly. Already in the 1611 Meletius, Grotius begins to move
away from his early voluntaristic position. What is more, Grotius wrote de
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Jure Praedae at the ripe old age of twenty-one, an age at which few figures
are well-established in their philosophical and theological foundations.
While Grotius was undeniably a child prodigy, it seems rather a stretch to
suggest that he plateaued after his early twenties. Furthermore, unlike the rest
of Grotius's vast corpus (including seventeen volumes of correspondence),
all but one chapter of de Jure Praedae remained unpublished until discov
ered in 1868. Tuck's careful attention to de Jure Praedae has unearthed
many insights into the work itself, but his attribution of its centrality to
Grotius's thought is open to serious question.
This casts doubt on Tuck's first premise that Grotius is preoccupied with
skepticism. If Grotius's main focus is to combat skepticism, his engagement
with Carneades is rather weak sauce. He spends a scant few paragraphs
dealing with skepticism, and never again refers to the subject in the remain
ing several hundred pages of de Jure Belli. Convinced skeptics would surely
remain unmoved. Rather, Grotius's principal targets appear to be those who
take up arms in defense of dogmatic minutiae, and his theological works
show little concern for the need to prove the existence of natural right from
the ground up.18 Ancient skepticism was indeed reemerging as a threat in the
early seventeenth century, but Grotius did not seem to feel much of a need to
prove it wrong. This seems to follow his medieval predecessors rather than to
depart from them.
This cursory attention to skepticism also undermines Tuck's fourth prop
osition that Grotius is operating on the ground of the skeptics, or building an
argument on a priori reason rather than traditional authority. In the very first
paragraph of de Jure Belli, Grotius in fact sets out a tripartite epistemology,
in which reason is supplemented both by revelation and history. He almost
immediately employs this threefold approach to justify natural Right. Rea
son, as Plato has shown, demonstrates that justice brings peace of con
science,19 while injustice causes torments and anguish to the tyrannical soul.
Revelation, which Grotius judges the most important of the three justifica
tions, informs us that God eternally punishes injustice and rewards justice.
Finally, history approves of justice and condemns injustice by "the common
agreement of good men."20 Elsewhere, Grotius will deepen this account of
history as a source of knowledge, arguing that the content of revelation is
known through sacred history.
In fact, de Jure Belli is littered with references to classical sources, and its
Index of Authors Cited comes to a full forty pages. Grotius makes over a
hundred citations each of Augustine, the Bible, Chrysostom, Cicero, Justin
ian, Livy, Plutarch, Seneca, and even the Aristotle whose authority Grotius is
allegedly attempting to undermine. In fact, if one looks immediately prior to
the quote Tuck uses as evidence of Grotius's anti-Aristotelianism (his second
argument), one finds the statement, "Among the philosophers Aristotle de
servedly holds the foremost place." Soon after, Grotius states that "Our pur-
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pose is to make much account of Aristotle."21 Indeed, he begins his discus
sion of many legal and political concepts with Aristotle, and in fact translates
the entirety of Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics V.8 in the midst of his own
discussion of guilt and injury. This approach of heavy citation is consistent
with his emphasis on history as a source of knowledge, as well as with his
emphasis on incorporating and building off of those who have gone before.22
It is not even clear that Grotius breaks with the medieval tradition to
create a proto-Hobbesian minimalist natural law, pace Tuck's fourth argu
ment. Some identify in Grotius a modern innovation that considers parts of
the Decalogue as only divine law and not part of the natural law. However,
this interpretation was not original to Grotius; over three hundred years earli
er, Scotus had made a similar argument. Furthermore, Grotius's DJB applies
the principles of natural law to innumerable potential situations of interna
tional practice in much the same way as did the scholastics to the moral life.
Grotius's recognition that not all truths of Christian revelation are accessible
to natural reason is hardly new or radical. If he is an innovator, it is in his
attempt to extend the reach of classical natural law outside the confines of the
political community, not to limit it.
Finally, Grotius's use of the "impious hypothesis" is arguably less impi
ous than it appears. For one thing, Grotius immediately emphasizes the pure
ly counterfactual nature of the hypothesis. Employing his aforementioned
tripartite epistemology, he promptly defends God's existence by reference to
natural reason, divine miracles, and unbroken human tradition.23 More im
portantly, even his hypothetical may be less impious than it appears. He may
be proposing a materialistic world with no God whatsoever, or a cosmos with
a prime mover, or in fact a deistic universe in which "the affairs of men are
of no concern to [God]." Should he mean one of the latter two options, this
statement would be no more controversial than the naturalistic metaphysics
of Aristotle himself, which were in fact embraced by scholastic thinkers as a
way to counter the proto-modern voluntarism of their (impious?) adversar
ies.24 Even if one remains unconvinced of Grotius's piety, one must at least
acknowledge that this "impious" claim far precedes Grotius. It traces its
lineage back to the fourteenth century in Gregory of Rimini and Gabriel Biel,
and even the neo-Scholastic Suarez made a similar assertion.25 Thus, the
mere presence of the "impious hypothesis" is insufficient evidence on which
to judge Grotius an essential modern, let alone an enemy of the premodern
tradition.

GROTIUS'S HUMAN NATURE AS NON-REDUCTIONISTIC
These arguments suggest that Grotius does not comfortably fit the portrait of
"modern revolutionary." However, they do not yet demonstrate the substan-
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tive classical continuity of his approach to nature. A closer look at Grotius's
foundations helps to fill in the positive elements of the picture. However, his
understanding of human nature, like many concepts in his writing, is not
straightforward and accessible. As one commentator notes, in some places
Grotius seems to say one thing, in other places another. For instance, in some
passages Grotius refers to man's self-seeking nature. Certainly these pas
sages do not escape the notice of observers such as Tuck. Yet in other places
Grotius speaks of altruism. This has led some to conclude that Grotius is
simply inconsistent in his portrait of human nature.26
Yet perhaps it is more plausible to interpret Grotius's apparent contradic
tions as a consistent belief that human nature is not monistic. To draw a
parallel, Plato's typology of souls shows that human nature can be focused
on reason, honor, or the passions. Yet the simultaneous existence of tyrants
and philosophers does not mean that Plato's understanding of human nature
is inconsistent. This pluralistic (or at least non-monistic) view of the human
soul can be more concretely inferred from Grotius's view that it is better to
enter into civil society, even though man is social and can already punish
wrongdoing in the "state of nature" (a term Grotius never uses). He justifies
the institution of third-party judges by reference to the fact that individuals
"too often have their own interests in view."27 This indicates that individuals
sometimes act according to justice and sometimes according to self-interest.
Thus, there must be at least two parts of the soul—the justice-oriented part
and the self-interested part—which are in tension with each other. Further
more, there must also be times when the just part of the soul is victorious and
the individual consequently acts in an altruistic manner.
This non-reductionistic conception of the soul is also evident in Grotius's
statement that "man is, to be sure, an animal, but an animal of a superior
kind, much farther removed from all other animals than the different kinds of
animals are from one another."28 Man shares some characteristics with ani
mals, and some men (particularly children) may share many of these charac
teristics. However, man also possesses a unique capacity of discursive rea
son, allowing him to develop his capacity for practical wisdom. If a man
chooses to correctly orient his will, he may become a "mature man,"29 which
brings to mind Aristotle's conception of the spoudaios. Such wisdom cannot
be c haracteristic of mere animals. Nor is it the automatic possession of all
men, as Hobbes seemed to view all human abilities.30 Rather, it must be
developed through uniquely human skill and experience.31 This process of
movement toward what seems to be a human telos implies the concepts of
potentiality and actuality, which again bears an Aristotelian imprint.
This multifaceted conception of the soul points toward a classical inspira
tion. Many modern thinkers such as Hobbes, Marx, and contemporary advo
cates of homo economicus attempt to create a science of man by eliminating
all but one variable. Man's behavior can be predicted by reference to single-
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cause explanations such as fear of violent death, class struggle, or desire for
economic gain. Each of these three modern positions suggests a monistic
view of the soul. In contrast, Grotius's pluralistic conception of the soul
leaves room for a will whose actions can never be predicted with certitude.
GROTIUS'S HUMAN NATURE AS RATIONAL
Grotius develops this idea of natural human reason more concretely when he
suggests that reason ought to control man's self-interested passions.32 He
writes that animals have a sort of nature which allows them to "secure advan
tage for themselves." However, man has a moral faculty, which leads a man
to refrain from harming others, even when it causes him a disadvantage.33
Thus, reason is not merely a calculating tool used to procure the "predeter
mined" end of advantage. Rather, reason itself can discern a good that
transcends advantage. He states that man's nature is to "follow the direction
of a well-tempered judgement, being neither led astray by fear or the allure
ment of immediate pleasure, not carried away by rash impulse."34 The con
cept of a rational will which can deliberate on moral ends further emphasizes
Grotius's Aristotelian heritage and his opposition to Hobbes. Hobbes argues
that reason is simply a calculative function, in service to man's passions. As
Alasdair Maclntyre has argued, the move from a rational will which could
deliberate on moral ends toward a calculative reason that could only deter
mine means to ends is a defining feature of modernity.35
This difference is evident in Grotius's and Hobbes's treatment of specific
behaviors. Grotius accepts Aristotle's understanding that fear of pain is in
continence, and that men have a moral responsibility not to succumb to it.36
For this reason, although a promise made under fear is binding, the one who
caused the fear is under a moral obligation to release the promisor.37 In
contrast, Hobbes argues that man naturally fears violent death. Men can thus
have no obligation to overcome this passion, but rather should calculate how
political institutions can be structured to prevent its negative external effects.
The same difference applies to vainglory, which Grotius sees as symptomatic
of moral weakness, implying that it must be overcome by moral effort.38 In
contrast, Hobbes sees vainglory as a constant and permanent striving of man,
to be subdued only by the coercive force of the Leviathan. Even in regard to
man's desires themselves, Grotius refers to Aristotle's distinction between
natural desires and unnatural ones.39 Once again, in reductive scientific fash
ion, Hobbes sees only natural desires. Some observers may read that Grotius
sees man as an animal, or as having passions, and conclude that he must be
similar to Hobbes. However, for Grotius, the animalistic passions are not the
whole of man. To assert that man is an animal is insufficient evidence of
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modern materialism; one would have to further assert that man is only an
animal. Grotius clearly espouses the former.

GROTIUS'S HUMAN NATURE AS SOCIAL
The idea that man is capable of acting altruistically and out of motives other
than fear is crucial to Grotius's understanding of human nature as inherently
sociable. In this regard, one of the most important statements in the entire de
Jure Belli is Grotius's assertion, contrary to Carneades, that "the very nature
of man, which even if we had no lack of anything, would lead us into the
mutual relations of society."40 Human nature—man in the state of nature—is
inherently social.
The importance of this statement can be seen by contrasting it with Hobbesian man. Hobbes holds that individuals are motivated by acquisitiveness,
diffidence, and vainglory. However, the resulting goods are external goods,
which is to say that they are limited. Thus, their possession is relative; if
every person has societal glory or honor, no person has it. Because everyone
desires these zero-sum goods, the world is characterized by scarcity and
competition. There cannot be friendship, only mastery. As Hobbes says,
"every man has a right... to one another's body"—and he is hardly referring
to Plato's Utopian community of wives and children.41 Society arises precise
ly because we lack things: specifically, basic security of body. Even physical
external goods (those corresponding to the body rather than the passions),
while perhaps not entirely zero-sum, are necessarily limited and subject to
scarcity.
In contrast, Grotius states that man would enter society even if he had no
lack of anything, including security of person. Even if everyone possessed all
the external, physical goods they could want, they would still want intangible
goods—specifically, social existence. Men desire not only physical goods
but friendship. Friendship is an internal, intrinsic good, corresponding to the
part of man's nature which transcends either (self-interested) physical exis
tence or the (self-interested) desire for mastery of others. As an internal and
nonrelative good, it cannot be described as zero-sum, and thus is not dimin
ished by being shared.42 This likely explains Grotius's assertion that the state
with justice is more fortunate than the state with arms.43 Hobbes would
surely disagree.
The related concept of a social and political realm, characterized by otheroriented friendship, has some roots in Aristotle. However, the Christian view
of self-giving love further develops the concept of friendship as an internal
good not subject to scarcity or zero-sum status. In fact, it is precisely in such
sharing that one receives. Although de Jure Belli is not a treatise on friend
ship, Grotius's reference to friendship indicates that he is firmly in the Aris-
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totelian-Christian camp. As he says, "We are drawn to friendship spontane
ously and by our own nature ... charity often advises me to put the good of
many above my own good."44

GROTIUS'S NATURAL REASON AS PRUDENTIAL
Just as Grotius's concept of human nature draws on the ancient model, so
does his understanding of natural reason. He begins his theory of knowledge
by asking the question of how one can discern the law of nature. He lists two
possible approaches. One is through a posteriori reason, which gathers evi
dence of those principles common to all nations—or at least all civilized
nations. The other is a priori reason, producing conclusions to which any
rational person must assent upon demonstration. Such knowledge is akin to
mathematical proofs "which are at once recognized and admitted."45
At first glance, these approaches may appear similar to those of Hobbes
and Locke, who argue that nature can only be known through the senses and
that the rules of logic then guide the mind in synthesizing this sense-data.
Hobbes, in particular, equated reason with mathematical calculation, and one
might be inclined to see in Grotius's reference to mathematics a latent Hobbesian position. Yet for Grotius, a priori reasoning is not the only way to
determine the (obviously moral) laws of nature. More importantly, however,
he cites Aristotle on the matter: "certainty is not to be found in moral ques
tions in the same degree as in mathematical science."46 This explains his
earlier statement that a not-entirely-universal acceptance of a particular no
tion does not jeopardize its status as true. He points out that honey does not
cease to be sweet simply because a sick man is unable to perceive its sweet
ness.47 This is a contrast to Hobbes, who repeatedly discerns universal laws
of nature in what he self-consciously considers a purely deductive fashion.
Furthermore, Grotius goes on to refer to the fact that moral life often
involves determining a mean—one that is prudential rather than mathemati
cal.48 Grotius thus acknowledges a difference between natural law reasoning
and good judgment.49 The latter is a foreign concept to Hobbes, whose Levi
athan has no prudence, only volitional law. Grotius's emphasis on prudence,
the fundamental political virtue of Aristotle, is another indicator of a classical
understanding of politics, one which holds that a good state arises only
through virtuous character. This stands in contrast to a modern scientific
view of politics suggesting that proper institutional design and law is suffi
cient. Not surprisingly, Grotius uses the term "science" less than a dozen
times in his work. In contrast, Hobbes makes it clear that he is applying the
methods of modern political science, of which he is the founder.50 It is worth
noting that in his theory of knowledge, Grotius does not deny the existence of
faculties, such as a priori reason, employed by moderns like Hobbes and
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Locke. However, he does not view the use of these faculties as exclusive of
all others. This refusal to take a reductionistic approach to reason echoes his
aforementioned multifaceted conception of human nature.
GROTIUS AND HISTORY
Grotius's a posteriori reason further illuminates a source of knowledge out
side the a priori reason often attributed to him as evidence of his essential
modernity: that of history. His aforementioned tripartite epistemology iden
tifies history as an important source of natural Right. However, it also serves
as an organizing principle for the third book of DJB. Here Grotius devotes
one chapter to enumerating the restraints of reason on carrying out war. He
then proceeds to add a hefty six more exploring the restraints arising from
historical tacit agreement. This suggests that the counsel of nature is most
fully manifested in the historically evolved practices or agreements of man's
free will.51 Throughout DJB, Grotius provides a detailed treatment of inter
national custom (jus gentium) as morally binding on nations.52 By using
historical examples and citations, he attempts to demonstrate the congruence
of many positive laws with natural law.53 Grotius in fact criticizes writers of
his own day for having neglected to supply illustrations from history and
endeavors to correct this oversight.54
Some might argue that this focus on history opens up history as an inde
pendent agent with a logic of its own. This might be seen to relativize truth or
even to suggest an achievable end of history that inevitably precipitates millenarian violence. Strauss's Natural Right and History famously suggests
history as a modern force opposed to classical natural right, and Voegelin
repeatedly warns against immanentizing the eschaton. On the contrary, how
ever, I would suggest that Grotius's approach to history is not so much
modern (let alone eschatological) as it is Christian. The ancient Greek con
ception of history is cyclical; Plato expects the ideal city to decline simply
because the seasonal patterns of growth and decay flow inexorably from the
nature of things. To this cyclical view Augustine counterposes a linear theol
ogy of history, one that points to a release from inevitable decline at the end
of time. On this foundation of possible progress the church then builds the
idea of development of doctrine; Christians are better off knowing that Christ
is one person with two natures. Even more central to Christianity, however,
is the fact that the birth, death, and resurrection of Christ are moments in
human history without which, as St. Paul says, "faith is in vain."55 To be a
Christian is to assent to a truth unavailable during earlier periods of history.
What is more, Christ does not give a new Ten Commandments but instead
speaks in parables. The spirit of the law cannot be propounded in formula
tions; it must be illustrated in narratives. In this way, Christ points to the
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limits of the Hebraic law; for instance, in the act of healing a man on the
Sabbath, he shows that its spirit supersedes its letter. (St. Paul will further
deemphasize the law; it can convict but cannot justify.)56 Because God re
veals himself most fully through the person of Christ, one can only come to
know the heights of divinity through the historical record of his actions—
most notably his passion and death.
Indeed, Grotius's oeuvre is self-consciously Christian. In addition to his
counsels of Christian virtue in de Jure Belli, he also wrote several theopolitical and theological treatises, one of which put forward a theory of
Christ's Atonement still current in the Methodist Church. Grotius also wrote
a work of Christian apologetics that would be published over a hundred times
in a dozen languages. Finally, he devoted his last decade to a massive twomillion-word commentary on the Bible that particularly seeks to illuminate
the historical circumstances that surround the words of Scripture.57 For in
stance, when Christ says that he has come not to oppose but to fulfill the law,
Grotius points out that Christ is referring both to the Hebraic civil law and
the law of God and that Christ fulfills the law not only through his doctrine
but through his example.58
Moreover, this Christian emphasis on fulfilling rather than overthrowing
the Hebraic law might just as well apply to the ancient conception of natural
Right as residing in the character of the philosopher. Plato illustrates this
conception in his Statesman by outlining the sixfold typology of regimes
more commonly associated with Aristotle's Politics. He then adds a seventh
type, that of statesmanship, which is characterized not by law but by the art
of ruling. Here the statesman acts as a sort of "living law."59 This shows that
the depersonalized law is one step removed from (and thus ontologically
dependent on) the personal art of ruling, just as dianoia depends on a higher
nous. Aristotle also illustrates this conception with his idea of the spoudaios,
who must discern the good in particular situations, but cannot make universal
prescriptions of his actions. For this reason, Strauss himself writes that Aris
totle's concept of natural Right resides more in concrete decisions than in
general propositions.60 Hence, in order to learn practical wisdom, one must
observe the spoudaios. Without direct personal access to Plato's statesman or
Aristotle's spoudaios, one must rely on historical accounts. This substan
tiates history as revealing nature rather than sweeping it away. In this way,
Grotius's approach to history as a source of knowledge is not a modern
proto-Hegelian stance but a Christian incorporation of the insights of ancient
natural Right.
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GROTIUS AND SUBJECTIVE NATURAL RIGHTS
Grotius's emphasis on history continues when he seeks to justify the exis
tence and origins of private property. Here he proceeds in much the same
way as had Pope John XXII in the Franciscan property dispute that Brian
Tierney identifies as the origin of natural rights.61 Grotius does not provide a
theological Filmerian argument that property was present from the very be
ginnings of man and passed down from Adam. Neither does he propose a
proto-Lockean argument that property ownership is inherent in work of one's
hands. Rather, he draws on history and prudence. At some early point in
history, humanity prudentially determined that the institution of private prop
erty could enable man to more fully live out his rational and social existence.
This collective reasoning was manifested in the consent of men to these
arrangements.62 This is consistent with Grotius's conception that rational
natural law may usefully be supplemented by practical judgment. Humans
are free to make behavior-limiting contracts that go beyond the duties im
posed by natural law.
However, this introduction of subjective natural rights to property has led
some observers to argue that Grotius is fundamentally modern. After all, if
one has a right to property, one can then do with that property what one will;
the possession in no way depends on a teleological account of the proper role
of property in human flourishing. Indeed, any subjective right confers an
absolute sphere of freedom on its holder, connoting a realm of individual
sovereignty. In other words, subjective natural rights seem to give the holder
the freedom to act against an overarching standard known to classical philos
ophy as natural Right. Is this not good evidence that Grotius is finally a
modern? Why allow individuals the right to ignore the higher ends of human
existence?
I would suggest that the answer to these questions draws on the same
logic as does Grotius's emphasis on history, again rooted more in Christian
ity than in modernity. The ancient concept of nature certainly points toward
an overarching standard of Tightness. However, it lacks a deep concept of
conscience. Indeed, classical philosophy generally assumes that the problem
of politics is ignorance; if people know the truth (or are governed by philoso
pher-kings who do), they will act virtuously. However, Christianity develops
the idea of the individual will and the possibility of its weakness. As St. Paul
writes in the Epistle to the Romans, "for what I would, that do I n ot; but what
I h ate, that do I."63 To this idea of individual conscience Christianity adds the
idea of individual salvation. No longer is eternity available through a national
covenant with God (as in the Hebrew world) or through the moral education
of philosophical governors (as in Platonic philosophy). Rather, Christ an
nounces that "the Kingdom of God is within you."
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For this reason, one's character when carrying out an act is more impor
tant than the act itself. It is now better to do the wrong thing for the right
reason than vice versa. Indeed, orthodox Christianity is reluctant to condemn
all those outside the church. Despite their ignorance of Christianity, their
intentions—known only to God—may yet be justified. Christianity thus
introduces the concept of invincible ignorance—a concept incompatible with
the strict nature of pre-Christian reason. (To use an analogue from physical
nature, the natural law of gravity makes no exception for skydivers who
earnestly seek to open their unknowingly defective parachutes.)
The implication of this emphasis on intention is that true virtue cannot be
coerced; the Christian cannot force the cavedweller to turn around. Rather,
virtue must be freely chosen. Christian grace does not compel; it can only
sweetly inspire. Hence, Christianity grants to humanity the freedom to act
against God and nature, and to refuse grace. By granting this right, one can
be sure that any subsequent good act is freely chosen and thus genuinely (and
not only apparently) virtuous. In this way, one might argue that subjective
natural rights actually deepen natural Right. Natural rights need not oppose
natural Right, because one can very well exercise his individual natural right
according to the higher standard. However, such exercise is more praise
worthy when one had the right to do otherwise.
Moreover, the concept of natural rights may in fact awaken a sense of
ownership in the agent who holds a right. If one is now saved as an individu
al soul rather than as a member of a chosen nation, one cannot shift the
responsibility onto others and hope to free-ride to salvation. Nor can one
blame the shackles of circumstance; if one is now only accountable for his
response to the light he has been shown, the absence of a Socratic guide
toward the sun is no excuse for inaction. This emphasis on personal respon
sibility further accounts for Grotius's belief that self-interest and charity
simultaneously coexist in human nature. The former is, in fact, the gift of a
provident God, because one's self-interest requires cooperation with others,
thus leading one to take on freely chosen responsibilities.65 Much like Tocqueville's concept of "interest rightly understood," one's own right may lead
to an enlargement of one's sense of responsibility. The extrinsic incentive
may gradually lead to the development of intrinsic (and thus genuinely virtu
ous) motives.
For this reason, medieval theorists had argued that individual rights and
the common good are complementary rather than conflicting aspects of the
human condition. Because Grotius's philosophy leaves room for intrinsic,
incorporeal goods, he continues in this tradition. Once again, commentators
might focus on the appearance of "self-interested" Grotius and read in him a
proto-Hobbesian conception of man. But because Grotius has a non-reductionistic concept of human nature, man is self-interested while also being
more than merely self-interested.66 In other words, individual rights do con-
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fer an absolute modern liberty to reject the teleology of ancient natural Right.
However, Grotius introduces them not to allow an escape from natural Right
but in the hopes of making the instantiation of natural Right a more fully
praiseworthy choice. He may thus help to enlarge the possibilities of human
action in the hopes that it will lead the person toward an end that transcends
humanity.

NATURAL RIGHTS AND HISTORY:
GROTIUS'S MODERN TRANSLATION
Has nature lost its appeal in the modern world? The word "teleology" would
fail a first round of political focus groups, and even the mere language of
virtue tends to arouse mental images of Saudi morality police. Yet the preva
lence of human rights discourse around the globe suggests that the implicit
concept of natural rights retains wide currency. If they do not mandate a
movement toward the fullness of human flourishing, they do prevent the
worst abuses against humanity. Individual natural rights are thus unlikely to
recede anytime soon, and despite the occasionally absurd inflation of rights
claims, even most critics of rights would be sorry to see them disappear. In
this way, Grotius may offer a way to maintain some link to the ancient
understanding of nature in a pluralistic modern world that resists legal man
dates based on comprehensive doctrines.
Nonetheless, if rights are here to stay for the foreseeable future, there are
surely better and worse ways to conceive of them. The task is to emphasize
that rights are a beginning, not an end. Grotius does precisely this. By confer
ring a sphere of individual sovereignty on the right holder, Grotius conceptu
alizes rights as protecting the freedom to make a truly virtuous choice. Rights
are grounded on a rich conception of the subject amenable to contemporary
discourse. Yet while Grotius's natural rights can be promulgated on a nonteleological basis, they ultimately point toward a vision of human flourish
ing. The careful reader will find that Grotius's concept of subjectivity is
ultimately rooted in an older Christian development of the ancient emphasis
on virtue as residing in the soul.
The same is true of the political language of history. Few today would
respond to a political discourse that rejects the several past centuries as a
grand mistake. Grotius's concept of history allows for the possibility of
progress and thus avoids the kind of fatalism or even cynicism that con
sciously propagates self-defeating practices from a belief that decline is inev
itable. Likewise, a belief in the relevance of particular historical circum
stances allows for legitimate diversity among societies, combating an unso
phisticated application of nature as a one-size-fits-all proposition.
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Yet Grotius sees history not as an autonomous force, but rather as the
locus in which nature is revealed. His Aristotelian concept of nature implicit
ly justifies history as the realm in which the virtues of natural Right are
instantiated and thus known. This allows for a culturally sensitive under
standing of nature that nonetheless rejects cultural relativism. Furthermore,
his Christian development of history makes him fully aware of the reality of
sin and the impossibility of perfection in secular history. Progress is anything
but guaranteed or linear. This guards against ideologies that would promise a
Utopia at the cost of trampling the human dignity of enemies of the revolu
tion.
In this way, the ambiguity of Grotius's legacy, following from his situa
tion at the crossroads between the ancient and modern world, may allow him
to maintain one foot in each. His modern idiom of natural rights and history
offers a (perhaps compact) entry point to nature. However, his ancient con
ception of man as fundamentally rational and social bids the right holder to
exercise his liberty in a way that points to a higher conception of human
existence rather than permitting him to ignore it. Thus, the rearticulation of a
Grotian approach to nature (and its implicit classical-Christian foundations)
may offer a realistic way to enrich contemporary political discourse. If the
modern world generally has ears to hear talk of nature in only one language,
Grotius may be a valuable translator.
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